

# U.S. Secret Service

A black silhouette of a bomb with a lit fuse. The bomb is a simple rounded shape with a short cylindrical neck at the top. A curved line represents the fuse, ending in a small starburst to indicate it is lit. A horizontal rectangular box is superimposed over the middle of the bomb.

## Bomb Book

*U.S. Secret Service Bomb Book*

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# Bomb Searches

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When time and situation permit, bomb searches should be made in all areas prior to the arrival of the Principal. When time and/or situation do not permit the completion of a thorough search, priority will be given to the immediate areas the Principal will occupy, with advisement made to the lead advance agent/site agent of the required curtailment. These searches are conducted in an attempt to locate any hazardous devices that may have been placed in or near an area in which the Principal will be present. Since the configuration of an improvised hazardous device and its emplacement depend on the ingenuity of the bomber, sufficient time must be allotted to the search teams to complete an efficient and thorough search. Physical security of the area should be scheduled to coincide with the beginning of the search. The following information provides general guidelines for conducting searches. Comments made are not intended to be all-encompassing, but rather to assist the search teams in objectively evaluating each site and determining their most effective search technique.

## 1. Hotel or Other Residences:

Search of the protectee's suite may be accomplished by a variety of techniques. The search technique chosen will be based upon the size and shape of each room and the furnishings and fixtures therein. Of primary importance is the employment of a systematic search pattern, which thoroughly covers the room and not just the "logical" targets.

For example, search of a typical living room suite may be accomplished as follows: Both men make a quick visual scan of the room for anything obviously "out of the ordinary". At various points in the room they listen quietly with eyes closed to accustom themselves to background room noises and to detect any mechanical timing devices. Having divided the room in half, they each start their "sweep" in opposite directions along the walls, merge at a diagonally opposite point, and sweep back across the center of the room to the starting point.

When using this technique, the search team will usually divide the room horizontally into three layers and conduct three coordinated sweeps: First, all objects resting on the floor and those extending up to waist level; second, those items from waist level to the ceiling; and third, the ceiling and any false ceiling duct area.

Within the suite there are several areas which require special consideration. For instance, the telephone could easily conceal a small, but lethal explosive charge with a variety of elaborate fusing mechanisms. Both speaker and microphone caps on the receiver should be removed and the contents examined. The telephone housing should be dismounted from the base plate and the mechanism inspected. In general, electrical appliances and wall connections provide ready made fuses for an explosive device hidden within the appliance's inner components or the hollow of a wall. Check inside the backplate of the television set. Remove all utility plates and closely examine the underlying electrical outlets, thermostats, and on-off switches.

When the room sub-ceiling is formed with acoustical panels, several panels must be lifted and the overhead area illuminated until thoroughly checked. Overstuffed chairs and mattresses should be probed, with special attention given to any evidence of newly repaired seams or padding. And finally, do not overlook any balconies or window ledges which would provide more easily accessible targets for the bomber.

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## **2. Office Buildings and Other Public Facilities:**

- a. In addition to the actual path and environs of the protectee within a building, various public maintenance areas must be searched as well. These areas would provide the bomber wishing to create a disruption or diversion the greatest opportunity to implant a device without being detected. Accordingly, the search should include lobbies, stairways, restrooms, utility rooms, custodial closets, electrical control centers, telephone switching rooms, auxiliary power supplies, central heating and air conditioning units and other similar facilities. Cracked paint seals or disturbed dust around closure fittings on access panels or utility plates must be fully investigated. Similarly, sawdust or other signs of new construction should be verified. Naturally, a search of this nature should be coordinated with the building manager to insure accessibility of all keys and to gain assistance in identifying areas/items which arouse suspicion.
- b. Elevators pose an unusual problem and require special attention. Begin by checking access to the motor room and the vicinity of the lift machinery itself. Inspect the cab interior, roof, sides, and bottom. In the safest manner possible for the system in use, insure there are no extraneous items attached to either the shaft walls, cables or counterweights. It should generally not be necessary for a searcher to stand on top of the cab as it is raised in the shaft; the building engineer should be able to provide technical assistance in the desired operation of the doors and lift mechanism. Occasionally an elevator shaft well will accumulate several inches of oil sludge which can be probed with a long stick. When all checks have been completed, the elevator should be operated through one complete, normal cycle to insure that nothing has been overlooked and that it is operating properly. Periodic checks should be conducted if security is not maintained on the designated elevator throughout the visit. It should be noted by the Detail Advance Agent/Site Agent that the protective detail is responsible for conducting safety checks of the elevators, and that the bomb search of the elevators should not be construed as accomplishing both functions.

## **3. Motorcade Routes:**

When searching a motorcade route prior to a protectee's movement, it may be assumed that an explosive device must be of significant size, relative proximity, or predetermined aim to be considered a potential hazard. For this reason primary emphasis should be directed toward checking any cavities under the surface of the road, any large objects situated on the roadside, and any tubular or platter-shaped apparatuses directed toward passing vehicles. If the road is paved, manholes over which the protectee's vehicle will pass should be inspected. Road shoulders should be observed for signs of recent digging which may conceal command detonation wires. Common sidewalk containers, such as trash receptacles, garbage cans, and mailboxes, should be checked. Unattended vehicles should be visually scanned, especially when situated on highways or other easily surveilled areas. Special attention must be given to bridges and culverts due to their capacity for concealing substantially large items. Additionally, any obstacle, ranging from heavy traffic congestion to an actual roadblock, increases vulnerability by decreasing the speed of the protectee's vehicle. Any such hindrance should be reported and special attention given to the surrounding area. The above guidelines are applicable for maximum security in situations where the route of the protectee is publicly announced and personnel are available for route security. In other situations, when requested by the lead advance agent, a fifteen minute car makes a quick visual scan of the route without detailed searching unless a suspicious item is noticed.

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#### **4. Airports and Aircraft:**

Searches of airports, aircraft and runways are discussed in detail in the following section on Protectee Travel Aboard Commercial Aircraft.

#### **5. Golf Courses:**

- a. Bomb searches at golf courses normally follow the same routine at the clubhouse as in any other building visited by the Principal. All areas in which the Principal will be present or pass through, as well as adjacent areas, will be searched prior to the Principal's arrival.
- b. When the Principal is involved in playing golf, unless otherwise instructed by the Detail Advance Agent/Site Agent, the TSD representative should conduct bomb searches approximately one fairway length ahead of the Principal. Particular attention will be given to all trees and shrubbery adjacent to the golf greens, and any critical areas noted during the preliminary survey. The EOD team will normally remain in the clubhouse for immediate response if requested, and should be provided with a golf cart as a response vehicle.

#### **6. Other Areas:**

Because of the numerous areas and buildings which a Principal may visit, and the peculiar situations that may arise, it is impossible to anticipate applicable procedures to fit every situation. However, searching operations will include all areas within which the Principal is located, including surrounding adjacent areas, above and below, when appropriate and when time permits.

#### **7. Tools and Equipment:**

Several specific tools help facilitate the search procedures. A flashlight will illuminate dimly lit corners and crawl spaces. A six-volt battery lantern would be even better for outside sweeps after dark. An electronic stethoscope aids in checking items such as lamp bases, which cannot be readily dismantled for inspection. Occasionally, grillwork will be bolted in place and a six-inch crescent wrench would suffice for removal. Similarly, utility plates are commonly held in place with screws, for which an assortment of flat-blade and Phillips head screwdrivers are required. Plants and overstuffed furniture are typical of items requiring screening where several 1/16 x 12 inch and 1/8 x 12 inch, non-conductive, spark-proof, probes would facilitate examination. When in doubt concerning a particular item which cannot be dismantled, an x-ray machine provided for package control may reveal clandestine components. And finally, realizing that people are reluctant to physically crawl underneath a car or behind a piece of oily machinery, one could easily appreciate having a small mirror secured to a telescoping handle.

Unquestionably, these few items are not meant to constitute a complete search kit, but they do provide the basic tools needed to deal with the most common obstacles to a thorough search. With the sophistication in modern terrorist bombing tactics, we can no longer depend upon mere "function testing" of various appliances, but must be prepared to fully examine their contents as potential explosive devices.

Thus, it is TSD policy not to designate which tools EOD personnel should, or should not, bring on protective details to effectively perform their mission. However, any such equipment which may be potentially dangerous in handling, such as pyrotechnically actuated mechanisms, should be kept in a secure location away from the protectee.

# Search of a Motorcade Vehicle

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The search of vehicles usually includes the Principal's limousine, the follow-up and the spare car. Vehicle searches consume approximately twenty minutes per vehicle for one man, and should be timed to be completed about thirty minutes prior to the Principal's arrival. Searches are conducted in areas where the least amount of attention is attracted, and should not be conducted without physical security.

The search of a motorcade vehicle should be made each time there is a movement of the protectee, unless the vehicle has been under constant surveillance by security personnel. Searches should be conducted in areas where the least amount of attention is attracted, and should not be made without physical security.

The guidelines given below are based upon the situation where at the beginning of the search there has been neither a threat made nor any other cause for unusual suspicion. Consequently, remote opening procedures are not detailed here and are left to the personal discretion of the search personnel.

- a. Before touching the vehicle, conduct an external search as follows:
  - Check the area around the vehicle. Look for bits of tape, wire, string, time fuse, etc., around the target.
  - Look for marks on the ground, such as footprints, jack stand impressions, etc.
  - Look for signs of forced entry: around the doors and windows; at the trunk; on the hood. Fingerprints on the trunk, hood, or wheel covers might indicate recent opening.
  - Look inside the vehicle, through the windows, for any obvious devices or packages that may not belong there. Look under the dash for wires hanging down. Look on the floor for packages partially hidden under the front seat.
- b. The most likely spot to find a bomb, if the vehicle is locked, is under the vehicle. Look under the vehicle for the following:
  - Disturbance of any surface dirt.
  - Chunks of dirt on the ground that may have been dislodged from under the vehicle.
  - Loose wires or strands of wire that are clean and probably 22 to 24 gauge.
  - Look under, on top of, and on both sides of all four tires.
  - Take off the hub caps and check inside them and also the wheel locking bolts.
  - Check the exhaust/muffler system for tampering. Look into the exhaust pipe for any inserted objects.
  - Check the gasoline cap for possible tampering.
  - Check inside the neck of the gasoline tank filler spout for foreign materials.
  - With a flashlight and mirror, look under the bumpers; in the wheel wells; on top of the drive train; under the motor; and under the gasoline tank.

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- c. Open the hood and check for the following:
- Actuating devices that may be attached to the clutch, brake, accelerator or steering linkage.
  - Signs of tampering with the air cleaner or equipment mounted on the fire wall.
  - Electrically initiated devices connected to power-operated equipment such as air conditioning, steering, and windshield wipers.
  - Out of place or unusually clean wiring.
  - Parcels of any sort that could contain explosives or incendiaries.
- d. Open a door, initially one other than the door to be used by the protectee, and conduct an internal search as follows:
- Check the interior thoroughly in a logical sequence, generally starting on the floor and working up.
  - Check under the floor mats for pressure sensitive switches.
  - Look under the front seats and lift and inspect under the rear seats.
  - Check the door panels for signs of tampering.
  - Check under the dashboard for any loose or unusual wiring.
  - Check the ash trays, cigarette lighters, rear seat radio speakers, vanity lights and dome light.
- e. Open the trunk and check the following:
- Any wires that may be attached to the vehicle's brake lights or rear turn signals.
  - Behind and under the spare tire.
  - The tool compartment.
  - The area behind the rear seat.
- f. Once it has been determined that there is no device under, on, or in the vehicle, turn on the ignition. As a final check, operate all dashboard controls to include lights, radio, horn, air conditioner/heater, windshield wipers, turn signals, and rear window defogger.

# Protectee Travel Aboard Commercial Aircraft

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When a TSD coordinator is assigned to provide support to a protective detail where departure by a commercial air carrier is involved, the TSD representative will coordinate security plans with the protective detail prior to contacting airport personnel. In the event a TSD Coordinator is not assigned, the EOD team leader will make this coordination with the protective detail lead advance agent to determine what action is required.

Normally liaison will be established as soon as possible by the TSD Coordinator/EOD team leader with the FAA, ATSSFO (Air Trans Security Field Office—a directory is maintained at the TSD Duty Desk: 202-395-4005) and the specific airline representative to formulate an efficient hazardous device deterrent plan, to include:

## **A. Passenger baggage and cargo inspection.**

1. Carry-on baggage: There will be a complete search of passenger carry-on baggage by airline personnel or designated agents. This search may consist of either physical or fluoroscopic examination, meeting FAA requirements. All searches will be under the supervision of a TSD representative.
2. FAA Regulation requires that all passengers be searched prior to boarding a commercial air carrier aircraft. However, in order to expedite the boarding of the protectee and party, exceptions to the regulations are granted in those cases where the Secret Service will vouch for the screening of the protectee entourage.
3. Checked baggage: Neither FAA nor air carriers require the examination of hold baggage; therefore, it will be the responsibility of the TSD coordinator, with the permission of the airline representative, to conduct fluoroscopic examination of all passenger hold baggage. An airline representative should be available to witness the examination of baggage; on most occasions this can best be completed in the baggage area; then escort to plane.
4. Cargo examination (freight, mail, etc.):
  - a. Although it is impractical to open or inspect each item of cargo, visual inspection of each package should be required when possible. Efforts should be made to determine if any cargo was destined specifically to the flight being utilized by the protectee. Additionally, a determination should be made regarding whether or not cargo has been held for shipping at least 24 hours.
5. Explosive detection dogs: The use of dogs is a valuable supplement in the examination of both hold baggage and air cargo.
  - a. Air Freight Cargo: Cargo is sometimes containerized at various locations prior to delivery to the aircraft. Where such cases exist, the container may be opened enough at planeside to allow for a scent to be detected by the dogs should concealed explosives be present.
  - b. Hold baggage: Detection dogs should be used in those situations where, for suspicious reason, forcible entry of a passenger's baggage is not desirable.

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## **B. Aircraft Search:**

The time requirements for a complete and efficient search of a commercial aircraft interior will depend on the aircraft type and schedule, i.e., ground time, turnaround time, etc. In addition, cleaning crews, maintenance crews, loading and unloading must be considered. When possible the TSD representative should endeavor to make the search when all flight preparation activities are completed.

1. To facilitate the aircraft search, an airline representative who is thoroughly familiar with the specific type of aircraft should be available to assist the TSD representative. (See attached Aircraft Search Checklist.)
2. In addition to searching the aircraft interior, particular attention should be given to searching the exterior, i.e., undercarriage wells, engine access panels, engine intakes, etc. Such inspections should be made with the assistance of qualified personnel such as flight crews or aircraft maintenance employees. This inspection usually is done first, followed by interior inspection.
3. Explosive dog detection teams may be used to supplement the search of aircraft interior and hold baggage compartments.

## **C. Runway Inspection:**

1. The TSD Coordinator/EOD team leader will, upon request by the protective detail lead advance agent/site agent, make an inspection of the assigned runway and taxiway as close to the aircraft arrival/departure time as possible. Such inspections should be arranged and coordinated through the airport manager.

## **D. Continuing Flights:**

When the flight originates other than where the protectee is boarding, consideration will be given to implementing the security procedures at the location where flight originates. When a situation of this nature arises, the facts will be discussed with a TSD supervisor and a decision rendered.

## **E. Summary:**

1. Experience has shown that the best method of control and coordination is by separating the TSD operation into three distinctive functions:
  - a. Passenger and carry-on baggage inspection.
  - b. Checked or hold baggage and freight inspection.
  - c. Aircraft search and runway inspection.
2. If at all possible the TSD coordinator should not assign himself to any single function. He should maintain a flexible position to troubleshoot those functions that may require his assistance.

# Baggage Inspection

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1. Baggage intended for storage aboard the Principal's aircraft should be inspected either fluoroscopically or physically.
2. TSD/EOD will inspect all handcarried baggage on departures of the President and Vice President. For other principals, this procedure is recommended; however, it should be decided on a case-by-case basis with the Protective Detail involved.

Handcarried baggage should be inspected at the aircraft stairs. EOD personnel should be stationed at the aircraft stairs to perform the necessary searches. TSD personnel should assist, if possible; however, in all instances, it should be prearranged so that the Protective Division agent assigned to the boarding point will be responsible for designating items (handcarried luggage, briefcases, purses, etc.) to be searched and requesting those boarding to open the item. EOD/TSD personnel should be aware that time is usually very limited, and they must be well organized so as to cause as little delay as possible in boarding. TSD/EOD personnel should not have to approach any passengers with instructions nor should TSD/EOD personnel have to make any decisions as to who will or who will not be searched.

Discretion should be used on departures when smaller aircraft are used and only official staff members are present. Again, the Protective Detail agent present will have the final say in this type situation.

3. Passengers should be notified in advance when baggage is to be fluoroscoped and warned of X-ray damage to undeveloped photographic film.
4. Baggage inspection areas will be established and located at the discretion of the TSD representative in the best interest of security.
5. After baggage is inspected, it will remain under security until stored aboard the aircraft.

# **Air Carrier Security Program Contingency Requirements**

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## **For Specific Threat and High Risk Situations**

If the detail agent, in response to the evaluation of a situation, determines a need for additional security measures for protectees traveling aboard commercial air carriers, the following procedures may be implemented at his discretion with the cognizance and coordination of the air carrier representative.

### **Increased Security Condition Requirements**

The following procedures are established for the upgrading of security measures to respond to non-specific bomb threats and to intelligence assessments that indicate a deteriorating civil or political situation at locations the air carrier is providing service.

1. All passengers and their carry-on items will be screened in accordance with FAR 121.538 requirements.
2. Only ticketed passengers and badged employees will be permitted beyond the passenger screening position.
3. Passengers and their hold baggage will be matched before boarding the flight for departure.
4. Air express contents will be verified or inspected prior to loading on aircraft.
5. Cargo and air freight will be delayed for 12 hours from delivery to carrier or inspected prior to loading on aircraft.
6. Aircraft will not be left unattended.
7. Fuel deliveries will be sampled and spot checked.
8. Visitors requiring access to carrier operations, maintenance and ramp areas will be escorted by carrier representatives.

### **High Risk Security Condition Requirements**

The following procedures are established for the upgrading of security measures to respond to high risk situations for aircraft operating to and from specific areas where intelligence assessments indicate individuals or groups present a definite threat to air safety. These measures must be stringent and provide the most formidable defensive posture to ensure the safety of passengers and aircraft against terrorist type activities. These measures should be coordinated with the airport authorities concerned and additional police support solicited.

1. All passengers and their carry-on items will be screened in accordance with FAR 121.538 requirements. In addition, passenger identification will be verified and the metal detection device will be operated at its most sensitive setting.
2. Only ticketed passengers will be permitted beyond the passenger screening position.
3. All hold baggage will be inspected prior to loading on the aircraft.

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4. Air express, cargo, and air freight will be either inspected or delayed for 12 hours prior to loading on the aircraft.
  5. Mail will be verified as inspected by the postal authorities or be delivered in sealed containers, or be delayed for 12 hours prior to loading on the aircraft.
  6. All fuel deliveries will be sampled and checked.
  7. No aircraft will be left unattended.
  8. Aircraft stores will be escorted from caterer, etc. to the aircraft.
  9. No unofficial visitors will be permitted in operations, maintenance and ramp areas. Official visitors will be escorted.

### **Specific Threat Security Condition Requirements**

These procedures will be immediately implemented by the carrier on receipt of a threat against specific aircraft of flight.

1. If the aircraft is in-flight, notify the captain of the threat and conduct a security inspection of the aircraft immediately after its next landing.
2. If the aircraft is being operated on the ground, advise the captain to immediately submit the aircraft for a security inspection.
3. Conduct a security inspection on the ground before the next flight of the aircraft and implementation above procedures.
4. Notification of the Administrator.

# Aircraft Search Checklist

707	737	747	1-11	Fuselage Interior
				Open lower nose compartment door, check compartment.
				Open NLG doors, check NLG bay, check doors and NLG strut.
				Open E & E compartment hatch (forward of NLG on 1-11). Check E & E compartment including all racks. Check area to left and right and in front of NLG wheel bay.
				<b>747 Only:</b> Check area between MEC floor and lower lobe skin to left and right of E & E access hatch.
				Open and check external power receptacle area.
				Open and check All toilet, water, potable water, hydraulic and pneumatic servicing panels, check area.
				With forward doors open and airsteps extended, check airsteps and airsteps recess below floor.
				Open forward cargo compartment door. Empty compartment. Check compartment.
				<b>707 Only:</b> Check oxygen bottle compartment aft of door, also check recess into which door slides.
				<b>747 Only:</b> Check crew oxygen bottle stowage, open zipped roof panels, check area. Check under walkways, track rollers and floor tracks. Check under all accessible side wall insulation.
				Open centre equipment centre door, check compartment.
				Unzip forward cargo compartment aft wall, check area.
				Check the Ram Air Inlets.
				Check the Ram Air Exits.
				Check the Turbo Fan outlets.
				Open MLG doors. Check MLG and MLG wheel bays.
				<b>707 and 747:</b> Check rear spar area.
				<b>737 only:</b> Check rear spar and walking beam areas.
				<b>1-11 only:</b> Check airconditioning bays as visible.
				Open aft Cargo Compartment door(s). Empty compartment. Check compartment.
				<b>707 only:</b> Check area into which doors slide. Check passenger oxygen bottle area.
				<b>747 only:</b> Check bulk cargo compartment.





707	737	747	1-11

### Cabin (Cont.)

Open and check all hat box stowages.

Open and check all oxygen bottle, fire bottle and medical kit stowages.

Open lower ceiling panels outside Toilets 9-11 and 10-12. Check aft equipment centre on Port side and spare life jacket stowage on Stbd. side.

Open ventral door, lower ventral stairs. Remove stairway side panels, check area, check stairway.

Open and check life raft stowages & stowage provisions.

Check access to MANUAL/AUTO escape slide controls.

### Power Plant


Open engine and fan cowls. Check general engine area. Check cowl.

Check fan exit area.

Check Turbo Compressor Air Inlet and exhaust.

Check Air Inlet particularly recesses at each secondary air inlet door, and all air scoops.

Check tail pipe.

### Wings


Extend LE and TE flap.

Open cove lip doors.

Check LE and TE Spar area.

Check canoe fairing on TE flaps.

Open refuelling dry bay panels, check areas.

Extend and check dump chute.

Check surge tank inlet scoops and vents.

View wing upper surfaces from cabin.

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## **Class 2 Security Inspection—All Aircraft**

### **A. Conduct a Visual Check of the Following Areas:**

1. Nose and Main Wheel Wells (with doors open).
2. Baggage and cargo compartments prior to loading.
3. Lower 41 area.
4. Electrical Electronic Compartments.
5. General cabin interior including overhead Racks/Bins and Stowage Compartments, prior to loading passengers.
6. Refuelling dry bays.

### **B. Conduct a Detailed Visual Check of the Following Areas Open Access and/or Service Doors and Stowage Compartments.**

1. Cockpit
2. Toilets
3. Galleys including cup dispensing and refrigerator mechanism compartments.

# Bomb Incidents

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## 1. Threats:

The most popular method of making bomb threats is by telephone. To insure that as much information as possible is received from the caller, the TSD representative working with the Intelligence Division Agent should brief all relevant telephone operators and Secret Service Command Post personnel and provide them with a "Bomb Threat Check List" (sample attached). This list will include such information as:

**Ask:** Exact location of bomb. Time set for detonation. What does it look like. What is the explosive. Why was it placed.

- a. If the individual receiving the call remains calm, it is often possible to extract more information from the caller. The presence of a checklist may suggest additional avenues of approach to the person talking to the caller.
- b. Although the Detail Advance Agent is normally the first to be informed of the bomb threat, it will be the recommendations of the TSD/EOD representative that will influence the final decisions. Therefore, the TSD representative will make the evaluation of the threat and one of the following recommendations:
  - (1) To take no action
  - (2) To search without evacuation
  - (3) To evacuate (and search)

The nature and extent of a search and evacuation operation will depend on the evaluation of a threat and time and resources available. Should a decision be made to search and/or evacuate a threatened area, consideration based on the following conditions should be applied:

- (1) Location of the protectee in relation to the perimeter of the area to be searched. (Except for very extreme and unusual circumstances, would it be necessary to search and/or evacuate a large multi-story building; i.e., a hotel, in its entirety).
- (2) Type and amount of security provided and whether a bomb search was conducted prior to the posting of security.
- (3) In the event a search is conducted, police and special agents should be used to inspect the immediate vicinity of their post areas. TSD/EOD personnel should first inspect all accessible and public areas; i.e., stairwells, restrooms, elevators and shafts, etc. Other personnel to consider, should a thorough search be required, are firemen, occupants, maintenance men, or other employees of the threatened area.

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## **2. Suspected or Actual Hazardous Devices:**

- a.** All hazardous devices, suspected or real, directed against the Principal (to include areas in which the Principal is present, in which the presence of the Principal is imminent, or immediate area in which the Principal is residing) will be considered the responsibility of the U.S. Secret Service.
- b.** In the event that a suspected or actual hazardous device is discovered, the safety of the principal will be considered first, and the TSD representative will:
  - (1)** Notify the EOD team and obtain their initial evaluation. It is the responsibility of the EOD personnel to advise whether the bomb should be moved, rendered safe, or temporarily left in place. If the local police or fire department have a Bomb Squad, the local Bomb Squad will perform any required render-safe procedures.
  - (2)** Simultaneously, if possible, notify the Detail Advance Agent, or his representative, and recommend action with regard to safety of the Principal.
  - (3)** If the Principal is evacuated, TSD personnel will monitor and report the facts of the subsequent investigation and hazardous device examination.
  - (4)** If the device is to be moved to a safe area, the previously determined evacuation route will be used.
  - (5)** If the bomb does not explode, security will be maintained on the device until all investigators and intelligence information is collected.
- c.** As a general guide, explosive ordnance units agree that the first unit on the scene (usually military EOD personnel supporting TSD) will examine the suspect item. The backup team (usually local PD) will render safe.
- d.** TSD will need a complete report in coordination with a field office agent. Final disposition of any determined hazardous device will rest with the responsible law enforcement authority. TSD SAIC will be advised as soon as possible.

## **3. Bomb Detonation**

- a.** In the event that a detonation of a bomb or hazardous device occurs in the vicinity of the Principal, the evacuation and security of the Principal will take first priority.
- b.** After the Principal is evacuated and secured in a safe location, the TSD representative will offer assistance to the Secret Service representative assigned to investigate the incident, when it does not interfere with his primary mission.
- c.** Should the situation require or cause request for assistance in damage control; i.e., treatment of casualties, fire control, etc., the TSD representative may provide such assistance **when it does not interfere with the primary mission.** In such an event, the possibility of successive detonations should be considered.

## EOD Employment Limitations

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There are specific tasks which EOD personnel either cannot do or should not be asked to do. These prohibitions are based upon Army Regulations and formal agreements between the military and the Secret Service. These limitations are as follows:

1. EOD personnel are not to be armed.
2. EOD personnel are not to stand post or to be used in any security function such as "holding" an area until security personnel arrive.
3. EOD personnel cannot conduct bomb searches for any civilian agency. The Secret Service is the sole exception to this rule and cannot "loan" the bomb search services of EOD personnel to civil police, etc.
4. EOD personnel should not be called upon to drive motorcade cars, operate the Command Post, or run errands.
5. EOD personnel cannot be responsible for gifts and packages after they have examined them. There must be someone to whom they can immediately give all items which have been inspected.
6. EOD personnel should not be posted at entrance to halls, auditoriums, etc., with instructions to examine all packages, briefcases, etc., **unless** an agent, police officer, or other individual with lawful authority to handle such situations is also present and specifically designates the items to be searched.
7. EOD personnel should not be instructed to conduct bomb searches in areas which will not be secured prior to initiation of the search. A bomb could be placed in such an area after the search; thus, the search would give a false sense of security.
8. EOD personnel should not be instructed to hold back crowds or perform other general law enforcement functions.
9. EOD personnel receive no training in, and should not be requested to perform, either audio countermeasures or locksmith skills.

# **Protective Support Protocol**

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It is obvious that the nature of protective support requires a high degree of personal discretion and professional integrity. However, to avoid any possible embarrassment, the following points bear reiteration:

1. Wear conservative business suits, unless other attire is specified.
2. EOD pins and credentials associate you with the Secret Service and should be displayed only for official purposes.
3. Avoid being in camera shots and television filming.
4. Do not carry personal cameras while on duty.
5. Do not have any conversations with reporters or the public about any activities concerning the Principal. If you are questioned by someone, refer him to a Secret Service representative.
6. During off-duty hours, do not patronize the bar in the same hotels where the Principal, press, or staff are staying.
7. Do not discuss your duties or the day's activities in public places.
8. Do not depend upon USSS dashboard placards to avoid traffic parking tickets.
9. Pay in full all incidentals on your hotel bill before departing.

Location \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

[illegible]

# Record of Bomb Threat Call

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1. Date \_\_\_\_\_ and time \_\_\_\_\_ of call.

2. Exact language used.

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3. Male \_\_\_\_\_ Female \_\_\_\_\_  
Adult \_\_\_\_\_ Child \_\_\_\_\_  
Estimated Age \_\_\_\_\_ Race \_\_\_\_\_

4. Speech:

Slow \_\_\_\_\_ Excited \_\_\_\_\_ Disguised \_\_\_\_\_  
Rapid \_\_\_\_\_ Loud \_\_\_\_\_ Broken \_\_\_\_\_  
Normal \_\_\_\_\_ Normal \_\_\_\_\_ Sincere \_\_\_\_\_  
Accent \_\_\_\_\_

5. Background noises. \_\_\_\_\_

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6. Name of person receiving call: \_\_\_\_\_

Notify: Upon receipt of bomb threat, dial the following number immediately and report the call:

Number \_\_\_\_\_

Extension \_\_\_\_\_

Do not discuss the call with other personnel.

1. Report the call, 2. Notify your supervisor, and 3. Follow instructions.

**ASK:** 1. Exact location of bomb? \_\_\_\_\_  
2. Time set for detonation? \_\_\_\_\_  
3. What does it look like? \_\_\_\_\_  
4. What is the explosive? \_\_\_\_\_  
5. Why was it placed? \_\_\_\_\_

Obtain as much information as possible about the bomb and its location. Legitimate callers usually wish to avoid injury or death. Request more data by expressing a desire to save lives.